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ABSTRACT 
This study sets out to critically examine and assess the main limitation provisions of Kenya's 
constitutional framework in providing a safeguard to the limitation of rights and fundamental 
freedoms vis a vis the international legal instruments that protect human rights thus setting out 
an internationally agreed upon standard for the limitation of rights. This study breaks down the 
provisions and examines it to see if they comply with the minimum requirement of a standard 
that is derived from an examination of three international instruments that set the stage with 
regard to the limitation of rights and fundamental freedoms. These instruments are, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and The International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights (CESCR). Generally, limitation of human rights must take into account the protection of 
public interest and the rights of the individuals. The structure of a limitation form may take a 
general form, meaning that it limits all sets of rights or a rights specific clause that limits 
specific rights. However, under article 24 of the Constitution, if the enjoyment of an 
individual's right and fundamental freedoms prejudice the rights and fundamental freedom of 
another, the law provides a limit to that enjoyment. 
This paper will attempt to identify and discuss the jurisprudence of Kenyan courts on the 
limitation of human rights, the process by which Courts in Kenya have interpreted this 
limitation and how this provision measures up against international instruments which provide 
the International threshold on limitation of rights. The study eventually reveals that in order to 
legally limit rights, the state must balance rights and interest of the individuals with that of the 
state so that the limiting measures should not outweigh the actual circumstances that necessitate 
the restriction, they must be non-discriminatory and finally not make a country avoid her 
obligation under international law. 
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In promulgating a new Constitution on 2 7 August 20 1 0, Kenya ushered in a new and 
progressive constitutional dispensation aimed at enhancing substantive equality, democracy, 
good governance and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 1• This is 
encompassed in the preamble of the 2010 Constitution, which expresses the commitment of 
the Kenyan people to nurturing and protecting the well-being of all, as well as recognising the 
aspirations of Kenyans to be governed by the values of human rights, equality, freedom, 
democracy, social justice and the rule of law.2A huge, integral part of this Constitution, is the 
bill of rights in Chapter four which encompasses the list of rights conferred to Kenyans 
generally as a whole and the specific classes of rights due to special groups of people or 
minorities. 
The rights conferred are, however, not absolute and can be subjected to legitimate limitation in 
accordance with the law. Since the state is formed by the political society for the protection of 
human rights, if the enjoyment of the individual's rights and fundamental freedom prejudice 
the rights and fundamental freedoms of another, the law provides a limit to that enjoyment.3 
Many Constitutions and human rights instruments allow for the limitations of rights where 
necessary in a democratic society. For instance, the repealed Constitution provided for the 
limitation of rights for the public good4 which was heavily criticized by the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) report as a 'limited version ' of the bill of rights included.5 
Therefore, limitations to the enjoyment of rights contained in a bill of rights, must be reasonable 
in order to avoid a situation where the Constitution gives with one hand and takes away with 
the other. 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
Prior to the enactment of the Kenyan Constitution 2010, the now repealed Constitution of 
Kenya 1963 was subject to claw back clauses which caused a lot of confusion and interference 
with the exercise of rights protected in the Constitution. The provisions were lacking in that 
1 PLO Lumumba & Luis Franchesci The Constitution of Kenya 2010: An Introductory Commentary' Strathmore 
University Press, 2014 
2 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 paras 5-6 of the Preamble. See also Article 10 of the 2010 Constitution which 
enumerates the national values and principles of governance 
3 PLO Lumumba & Luis Franchesci The Constitution of Kenya 2010: An Introductory Commentary ' Strathmore 
University Press, 2014, P 143 
4 S 14, Constitution of Kenya, 1963 
5 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) 27, 2005. 
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they ought to have provided for instances when the fundamental rights and freedoms could be 
limited, but also with regard to particular rights and to what degree the limitation could be 
extended. In contrast, Article 24 ofthe Constitution of Kenya 2010 is a "new and improved" 
version of these clauses that goes even further to include what the repealed Constitution of 
Kenya lacked and also provides limits as to limitation by way of giving the procedure to be 
followed. It makes use of one single general clause expressly identifying the limitations of 
rights and fundamental freedoms. This is a huge step forward in the protection of rights 
especially because a comprehensive limitation clause takes into account the socio economic 
rights that were absent in the previous Constitution. 
To add on to this, article 25 ofthe 2010 Constitution clearly lays down the fundamental rights 
and freedoms that are not subject to limitation. These rights include freedom from torture and 
cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from slavery or servitude, the 
right to a fair hearing and the right to an order of habeas corpus all of which cannot be limited 
and are non-derogable.6 The rationale behind this is that fundamental rights are natural 
obligations with application egra omnes7 . They are inherent and precede the state which is 
formed by the political society for the protection of such rights. However, under article 24 of 
the Constitution, if the enjoyment of an individual's right and fundamental freedoms prejudice 
the rights and fundamental freedom of another, the law provides a limit to that enjoyment. This 
paper will attempt to identify and discuss the juris prudence of Kenyan courts on the limitation 
of human rights, the process by which Courts in Kenya have interpreted this limitation and how 
this provision measures up against international instruments which provide the International 
threshold on limitation of rights. 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
A limitation clause acts as a contentious provision in human rights since it seeks to curtail the 
enjoyment and exercise of rights guaranteed in a national constitution. Rights should just not 
be limited on a whim therefore the mandate conferred to the relevant authorities by the people 
of Kenya8 to curtail their rights should not only be used sparingly but should also constantly 
be checked to avoid abuse, begging the question, does the judicial interpretation of the 
6 Article 25, The Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
7 The concept was recognized in the International Court of Justice's decision in the Barcelona Traction case 
[(Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1970 3 at paragraph 33 
8 Article 1 , The Constitution of Kenya 2010 
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Constitution of Kenya offer an effective approach to the limitation of rights VIS a VIS 
International Standard for limitation of rights? 
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The general aims of this study are to illustrate a suitable approach to limiting rights. It is an 
inquisition into the reaction of the judiciary especially to article 24 specifically and even more 
importantly how the lives of Kenyans have been or will be affected by this clause and its 
interpretation in the courts. It will determine whether, the limitation of the rights of Kenyan 
citizens is within reason, is justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account relevant factors, including the nature of the 
right or fundamental freedom, the importance ofthe purpose ofthe limitation, the nature and 
extent of the limitation, the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental 
freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; 
and the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose having in mind that limitation should be reasonable, justifiable 
and proportionate.9 
Despite the fact that limitation clauses provide direction on the mode of justifying rights 
limitation, there is value in assessing the balance between the harm and benefits of limitation. 
As a result the study will assess the limitations outlined in Kenya's constitution, with the 
purpose of identifying whether the limitation clause is in consonance with the international 
standards and principles protecting human rights. 
1.5 HYPOTHESIS 
The limitation clause in the Constitution of Kenya 2010 is a general limitation clause whose 
interpretation in the courts impacts on all Kenyans. If not checked this ability to limit rights 
can be counterproductive to having protected rights in the first place. The formulation of the 
limitations of human rights clause under COK 2010 is deleterious to the protected rights 
because despite the fact that limiting rights is legitimate and justifiable, such limitation must 
be held against international standards, be justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom having in mind that any limitation should be 
reasonable, justifiable and proportionate . Due to its generality, the limitation clause is wide 
open and can be subject to abuse. 
9 Article 24 , Constitution of Kenya 
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1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
The broad objective of this study is assessing Kenya's 2010 Constitutional framework in 
providing safeguards to the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms Vis a Vis 
international legal instruments that protect human rights. 
In order to assess the extent to which the Constitution of Kenya provides a proper formula in 
limiting rights as well as its limitation clause Vis a Vis the international instruments protecting 
human rights, the following research questions are pertinent: 
1. What are human rights? 
2. What is limitation of rights? 
3. Is limitation of rights lawful? 
4. How does limitation vary from derogation? 
5. How is article 24 of the Kenyan Constitution interpreted in the courts? 
6. Does Kenya's 2010 constitution approach the question of limitation of rights 
appropriately? 
7. What reforms ought to be considered to enhance protection of rights Vis a Vis the 
human rights discourse? 
1.7 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
Article 24 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 states that 
"A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except 
by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors ... " 
The purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is to 
preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice and the 
realization of the potential of all human beings. The Bill of rights is a document that concerns 
everyone in the society. Concurrently, not all of these rights are absolute. In fact, a good 
majority of these rights are not and so they must be limited for a number of reasons, public 
policy, national security and common good being at the top of the list. If it so happens that the 
manner through which these rights are limited or the law that provides for their limitation is 
lacking, the resounding effect maybe catastrophic. 
4 
This study will be particularly useful to legal scholars because it will shed light on the principles 
underlying limitation of rights with a purpose of reaffirming what entails a proper limitation 
clause and the approach toward it. It will determine the loopholes in limitation of rights in the 
Kenyan constitution with the aim of integrating and benchmarking against the international 
standards as regards limitation of rights in order for the authority to make appropriate limitation 
without defeating the essential purpose of rights. 
The results of this study will also be beneficial to every Kenyan in the sense that their individual 
rights are affected and that if the study does indeed find a lacuna in the law, this will be the 
first step in addressing this issue and to coming up with possible effective solutions. If indeed 
the law is airtight this research will go a long way in reassuring the citizens protected under the 
bill of rights especially in Kenya that their rights are wholesome and the procedures 
surrounding the application of their human rights is fair and justified. 
1.8 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The dissertation will be divided into 5 chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 - Contains the proposal to the study that highlights the objectives, its significance, 
research questions and general introduction to the study. 
Chapter 2 -Contains the theoretical framework and introduces the idea of limitation of rights, 
their justification and the various jurisprudential works of scholars relevant to the study of 
limitation of rights 
Chapter 3 -Contains an analysis of article 24, the nature and structure of the limitation clause 
and its interpretation and implementation in Kenyan courts. 
Chapter 4 - Contains an analysis of the international and regional human rights instruments, 
more specifically the African Charter, ICCPR and the CESCR. The aim of this chapter is to 
identify the nature and scope and standard of limitation under these instruments and their 
implementation. 
Chapter 5 -Contains the general conclusions and determination on the whole dissertation as 
well as recommendations and highlights as to what extent the objectives of the study where 
met. 
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1.9 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the following is the definition of some of the most 
important and relevant terms. 
Bill of rights - The first 10 amendments to the American Constitution make up the Bill of 
Rights. Written by James Madison in response to calls from several states for greater 
constitutional protection for individual liberties, the Bill ofRights lists specific prohibitions on 
governmental power. 10 
Derogation- to suspend certain civil and political liberties-in response to crisis. 11 Different 
from limitation in that limitation is not a suspension of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Limitation is by operation of the law and derogation as a result of circumstance. 
Fundamental freedoms- the rights and freedoms considered essential to the functioning of a 
democracy. 12 They allow individuals and groups to express themselves, to believe and practice 
what they choose, and to exercise their right to vote. For example, freedom of religion, speech, 
and conscience are fundamental freedoms. 
Human rights - are natural obligations with application egra omnes that are inherent and 
precede the state, which is formed for the protection of such rights. 13 
Limitation - the assignment, as by statute, of a period of time within which an action must be 
brought, or the period of time assigned. 14 
Restrictive means - by way of imposing restrictions or limitations on someone's activities or 
freedom. 
10 https :/ /www. billofrightsi nstitute.org/foun ding-documents/bill-of-rights/ 
11 Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties by Emilie M Haener-Burton, 
Laurence R Heifer and Christopher J Farris 
12 https://ccla .org/focus-areas/fu nda menta 1-freedo ms/ 
13 PLO Lumumba & Luis Francesca, 'The Constitution of Kenya 2010: An Introductory Commentary' Strathmore 
University Press, 2014, P 143 
14 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Anyone who professes to take rights seriously must first accept at the minimum, the vague but 
powerful idea of human dignity. 15 Human rights can be legally enforced or exercised against 
abuse because they are entitlements ofhuman beings by virtue of being human beings no matter 
their economic standing, race, tribe religion, politics ideologies and whatever other factors that 
differentiate human beings. This chapter will explore the human rights discourse and lay out 
the conceptual framework that this dissertation relies on. 
2.2 WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Human rights are the basic rights and freedoms that belong to every person in the world, by 
virtue of being human from birth until death. They apply regardless of origin, belief or how 
you choose to live your life. They can never be taken away, although they can sometimes be 
restricted. 16 They are based on values that reflect in humanity like dignity, equality, fairness 
and equity. All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and related. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasisP They are universal, inalienable, dependent, 
indivisible, equal, and non-discriminatory and entail both rights and obligations 18 • 
Human rights law can be traced back to the Cyrus Cylinder which came about after Cyrus the 
great conquered the city of Babylon in 539 BC. 19 King Cyrus freed all the slaves they had 
captured during the conquest to return home and continued to declare that people should be 
free to choose their own religion. The Cyrus cylinder, which is a clay tablet containing his 
statements is the first human rights declaration in history20 . Certainly, this idea of human rights 
caught fire and spread quickly into India, Greece and eventually Rome. 
15 Dworkin R, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard university Press, 1977 
16 https://wvvw.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-rights/what-are-human-rights 
17 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, 1993 
18 http://www .ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx 




Soon thereafter, in 1215, the Magna Carta was signed by King John of England after he violated 
a number of ancient laws and customs by which England had been governed21 . It gave people 
new rights and made the king subject to the law. The Magna Carta went on to arguably become 
the most significant early influence on the extensive historical process that led to the rule of 
constitutional law today. Later developments in 1628, The Petition of Rights set out the rights 
of the people.22 The English Parliament produced it and sent it to King Charles I as a statement 
of civil liberties that were based upon earlier statutes and charters and asserted four principles 
that; No taxes may be levied without consent of Parliament, no subject may be imprisoned 
without cause shown (reaffirmation of the right of habeas corpus), no soldiers may be quartered 
upon the citizenry and that martial law may not be used in time of peace23 . In 1948, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the first document listing the 30 rights to which 
everyone is entitled. It set(s) out the fundamental human rights to be universally 
protected24.Today, human rights are classified and organised in several different ways. At an 
international level the most common categorisation of human rights has been to split them into 
civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. Civil and political rights are 
enshrined in articles 3 to 21 ofthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Economic, social and cultural 
rights are enshrined in articles 22 to 28 of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights (UDHR) 
and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
2.3 THE LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Some human rights -like the right not to be tortured- are absolute. These 'absolute ' rights can 
never be interfered with in any circumstance.25 However, most human rights are not absolute. 
In Kenya, the Constitution sets the fundamental rights and freedoms that may not be limited 
therefore making them absolute. They are, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from slavery or servitude, the right to a fair trial 
and the right to an order of habeas corpus.26 Allowing rights to be limited is neither new nor is 
it wrong. It is only in cognizance of the fact that all rights are not absolute. 
2 1 http://www.humanrights.com/what-are-human-rights/brief-history/magna-carta.html 
22 http://www.constitution.org/eng/petright.htm 
23 http://www .h umanri ghts.com/\vhat-are-h uman-ri ghts/brief-hi story/magna-carta. html 
24 UN General Assembly. (1948) Universal declaration of human rights (217 [III] A). Paris. 
25 https:/ /www .ag.gov .au/Ri ghtsAndProtections/I-1 umanRi ghts/I-1 u man-rights-
scruti n v/Publ icSectorGuidanceSheets/Pages/ A bsol uteri ghts.aspx 
26 Constitution of Kenya, Rev. 2010 Article 25 
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Article 24 however, the focus of this paper, is on the specified limitation within the 
Constitutional bill of rights. They are described as 'limited' which means they can be restricted 
in certain circumstances as specified in the relevant article (24) in the Constitution of Kenya, 
2010. For example, the right to liberty, freedom of movement and to some extent, freedom of 
association, is limited if a person is convicted and sentenced to prison. Notably, no one piece 
of legislation covers all the human rights. Others are contained in the international human rights 
treaties which Kenya has signed and ratified. Those treaty rights are binding on Kenya in 
international law by virtue of article 2(5) which states that any treaty or convention ratified by 
Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under the Constitution. This means that Kenya has 
agreed to them and the Government must comply with them. 
Similarly, some other rights are described as 'qualified' which means they can only be 
restricted in order to protect the rights of other people or if it's in the public interest for specific 
reasons such as the prevention of crime or preservation of public order.27For example, the 
Government may restrict the right to freedom of expression if a person is encouraging racial 
hatred or even impose a curfew in a small town, limiting freedom of movement and association 
during the curfew as an attempt to curb crime. 
2.3.1 THE GENERAL LIMITATION CLAUSE 
Internationally, treaty bodies evaluate on a case by case basis whether a specific limitation is 
excessive or not in the circumstances. There are some general dicta that are applicable to all 
limitations which has led to what can be termed as a basic general limitation clause which 
typically provides as follows: 
1. That the limitation must be provided by law; 
2. The measure must have the purpose of protecting one or more of the collective needs 
limited in the limitation clause; 
3. The measure must be necessary in order to protect the named collective need.28 
There are some variations provided especially in International instruments. For example, the 
ECHR provides in all its general limitation clauses that the measure must be 'necessary in a 
democratic society' 29, and article 12 of the ICCPR on freedom of movement adds that 
limitations 'must be consistent with the other rights recognised in the present 
27 http://wvvw .constitution. gov .kv/www.constitution. gov. kv/portal/pageb5 9e.htm l 
28 Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism, Oxford University Press,2011 ,71 
29 Article I protocol I ECHR 
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covenant'30 .Similarly, the African Commission of Human and Peoples Rights contains a 
general limitation clause in article 27 paragraph 2 as follows: 
The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the 
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest. 
This provision as we shall see below has been used by The African Commission in order to 
restrict government's interpretation of limitations to rights that may seem over broad in some 
ofthe provisions in the African Charter. 
By way of contrast, the Bill ofRights in the Independence constitution, was littered with 'claw-
back' clauses that often defeated the very essence of guaranteeing human rights, hiding behind 
the internal limitations assigned specific rights as well as the general limitation clause entaiiing 
that rights would be restricted for greater public interests, for example, for public safety, 
security and health31 • Due to these limitation clauses, the Bill of Rights ended up taking away 
rights more than it guaranteed. The 'claw back' clauses also found favour in the manner in 
which the repealed Constitution was interpreted. Which was popular because ofthe wide berth 
it gave judges .The Judiciary, which was entrusted with the task of protecting fundamental 
rights and individual liberties, had adopted a very restrictive approach to human rights litigation 
and constitutional interpretation32 . In one instance, the High Court dismissed an applicant's 
pleadings on the technical ground that he did not identify which constitutional provision had 
been contravened. In Koigi wa Wamwere v Attorney GeneraP3 , the Court held that section 72 
of the Constitution protected the fundamental right to liberty, but did not specify the manner in 
which arrests could be made, or where such arrests could be effected. The tribunal declined to 
concern itself with extradition or the manner in which police officers carry out their duties. 
2.3.2 THE FEATURES OF A GENERAL LIMITATION CLAUSE 
Phrasing a limitation clause as general, is in light of its application to some of the rights in the 
bill of rights that may be limited in the same criteria34 . For example, article 24 ofthe Kenyan 
Constitution makes provision for limitation of rights where such limitation is permissible by 
30 Article 12, 3, ICCPR 
31 J Mutakha-Kangu ' The theory and design of limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms' (2008) 411 The 
Law Society of Kenya Journal 1 
32 Mbondenyi, Kiwinda, and Osogo Ambani. New Constitutional Law of Kenya. : Principles, Government and 
Human Rights, Law Africa Publishing Ltd, 2012 
33Koigi wa Wamwere v Attorney General Miscellaneous application NC. Number 574/90. 
34 Van Der Schyff, Limitation of tights 'A stud of the European Convention on Human Rights and the South 
African Bill of rights'2005 
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law reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society ... to this end, the general 
limitation clause acts a s a key provision in interpreting the bill of rights through to justifiable 
criteria; an interpretation through the laws of general application and the requirement that the 
limitation clause ought to be reasonable and justifiable within an open society founded on the 
principles of human dignity freedom and equality. 
2.3.3 LIMITATION V DEROGATION 
Derogations provide in effect, that state measures that would normally be a violation of the 
human rights treaty would not contravene the treaty if these measures are taken in exceptional 
situations and only to the degree absolutely necessary35. Derogation is an international law 
concept and should only come into effect in times of ;:var,36 public emergency which threatens 
the life of a nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.37Ideally, if the 
emergency is the result of an armed conflict, then the next step is to respect International 
humanitarian law but despite these there still exists non derogable rights which are protected 
under the list of absolute rights in Kenya38 . Similarly and common not only to the EHCR and 
ICCPR but also the ACHPR, are the rights to life, prohibition of torture, inhumane, cruel or 
degrading punishment, prohibition of slavery and servitude and the prohibition of criminal 
conviction or punishment not being based on a pre-existing law, which by virtue of these 
instruments are non derogable. 
Clearly the difference between derogation and limitation lies in the situation in which they 
apply in the sense that derogations are imposed only whenever there is a declared state of 
emergency which is used by the states to buy time and have a legal breathing time as a 
temporary measure to combat the crisis. A good example would be as was the case in 
Mpeketoni and Lamu where there was a terrorist attack in 2014.39 Article 58(6) of the Kenyan 
Constitution read with article 4 of the ICCPR40 requires that the enactment of statute resulting 
from a declaration of a state of emergency should only limit rights or fundamental freedoms to 
the extent that the restriction is required during the emergency. If rights are to rightfully and 
35 Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism, Oxford University Press,2011,79 
36 EHCR article15 
37 Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism, Oxford University Press, 2011, 79. 
Also please see ICCPR article 4, I 
38 Article 25 , Constitution of Kenya 2010 
39 http://www.bbc .com/news/world-africa-27862510 
40 General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry to force in 23 March 1976 
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legally be curtailed outside the purview of IHL, then they must be limited in accordance to the 
relevant laws. 
2.4 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
The quarrelsome nature of a man cannot allow for his peaceful co-existence with the rest of his 
kind without setting up laws that limit his personal rights41 . The social contract theory is a 
philosophical theory that states that in the beginning man lived in a state of nature. They was 
neither government nor law to regulate them so therefore, man experienced hardships and 
oppression. To overcome these hardships they entered into two agreements: Pactum Unionis 
and Pactum Subjectionis 42 . In the first pact, unionis, people sought protection of their lives 
and property and as, a result a society developed where people undertook to respect each other 
and their property and live in peace and harmony. The second pact of subjectionis, united 
people together and they pledged to obey an authority and surrendered the whole or part 
of their freedom and rights to an authority who guaranteed everyone protection of life, 
property and to a certain extent, liberty.43 
Thomas Hobbes, one of the earliest proponents of this theory, submitted that the state of nature 
was one of fear and selfishness (before the social pacts). One in chaotic condition of constant 
fear which is what lead to the development of the two agreements. He rejected the 
communitarian and corporative aspects of the social contract tradition. For Hobbes, the bearers 
of the right to consent to government, and of the right to resist government that violates the 
social contract, are always and primarily individual persons. It is not the community that 
consents to government through an agreement between its authorized representatives and the 
sovereign: it is the whole body of individuals, each making an agreement with every other 
individual, to alienate their natural rights and liberties to a government and sovereign that they 
together agree to create. It is only when such an agreement among individuals has been reached, 
Hobbes argues, that a corporate body like the people or the community can be said to exist. 
There is no pre-contract community44, nor is there any agreement between the sovereign and 
the people. Other proponents of this theory, like John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau further 
41 Thomas Hobbes, Social Contract. 
42 Manzoor Elahi, What is Social Contract? 2005 
43 Thomas Hobbes, Social Contract 
44 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil 
( 1651) 
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developed the theory and focussed their discussions on a specific aspects of the Social Contract 
theory. According to them, through Social Contract, a new form of social organisation, 
the state, was formed to assure and guarantee rights, liberties freedom and equality45 . 
More specifically, for Locke, the social contract is among individuals. Though these 
individuals live in a pre-political society-he averred that the state of nature is one in which 
society already exists. For Locke, the contractors and the bearers of rights to authorize 
government and to resist oppressive government are, essentially individuals46 . 
The social contract is one of the arguments that justifies limitation of rights. It is important to 
note that in order for society to live harmoniously, the relevant governing authority, the state, 
in order to be able to guarantee rights especially so that all its citizens can enjoy them, has to 
limit rights to avoid an overlap. This power to limit comes first from the people who agree to 
give up their freedoms and liberties to a community for better protection of their rights. This 
concept is well embedded in the Kenyan constitution by way of the principle of sovereignty. 
The relevant article states; 
I. ( l) all sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya and shall be exercised only 
in accordance with this Constitution. 
(2) The people may exercise their sovereign power either directly or through their 
democratically elected representatives.47 
The article continues to state the various governmental organs to which this power is delegated 
who have a duty to exercise that power and their functions in accordance with the Constitution. 
Government may not do some things, and must do others, even though the authorities are 
persuaded that it is in the society's interest (and perhaps even in the individual's own interest) 
to do otherwise, individual human rights cannot be sacrificed even for the good of the greater 
number, even for the general good of all. However, if human rights do not bow lightly to public 
concerns, they may be sacrificed if countervailing societal interests that are important enough, 
in particular circumstances, for limited times and purposes, to the extent strictly necessary.48 
Conclusively, the idea of limitation of rights is as a result of the social contract that not only 
enable limitation but also justify limitations. 
45 Manzoor Laskar, Summary of Social Contract Theory by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Symbiosis International 
University, Date Written : April4, 2013 
46 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government ( 1688) 
47 Article I , The Constitution of Kenya, 20 lO 
48 Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press, 1990) 4 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed the principles that apply in respect to human rights, what human 
rights really are and why they should be limited as well the conceptual framework that supports 
the limitation of rights with a highlight on the different types of limitation clauses as well as 
their different effects when applied to the Kenyan context while differentiating derogation from 
limitation. To conclude, this is the main anaJysis of the aspect of limitation of rights and 
fundamental freedoms in respect to the Kenyan Constitution 2010. 
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CHAPTER 3: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLAUSES 
IN THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The repealed Constitution provided for rights and freedoms under its Chapter V, whose 
provisions were criticized by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission because all the 
rights guaranteed were subject to provisions of other statutes. The national assembly under the 
repealed Constitution therefore had all the legislative avenues fo r restraining fundamental 
rights and freedoms thereby opposing the very rights sought to be upheld by the Constitution. 
The 2010 Constitution takes cognizance ofthe individual rights and fundamental freedoms of 
the citizens. In tandem with this recognition, it avoids or limits the inclusion of claw back 
clauses in most of its provisions unlike the repealed Constitution. In this chapter, the focus is 
on analysis of the limitation clauses on the rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Kenyan 
Constitution. The chapter will review with specify the nature of the limitations imposed on the 
Bill of rights in the Constitution ofKenya 2010. 
3.2 ARTICLE 24 OF THE 2010 CONSTITUTION 
Article 24 is a general limitation clause that attempts to regulate the process of limitation of a 
rights in Kenya. It states; 
24. (1) A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then 
only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable andjustifiab.le in an open and democratic society bas~d 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including-
( a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual 
does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and 
(e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Despite clause (1), a provision in legislation limiting a right or fundamental freedom-
( a) in the case of a provision enacted or amended on or after the 
effective date, is not valid unless the legislation specifically expresses the intention to limit that 
right or fundamental freedom, and the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(b) shall not be construed as limiting the right or fundamental freedom unless the provision is 
clear and specific about the right or freedom to be limited and the nature and extent of the 
limitation; and 
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(c) shall not limit the right or fundamental freedom so far as to derogate from its core or 
essential content. 
(3) The State or a person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall demonstrate to the court, tribunal 
or other authority that the requirements of this Article have been satisfied. 
(4) The provisions of this Chapter on equality shall be qualified to the extent strictly necessary for the 
application of Muslim law before the Kadhis ' courts, to persons who profess the Muslim religion, in 
matters relating to personal status, marriage, divorce and inheritance. 
(5) Despite clause (I) and (2), a provision in legislation may limit the application of the rights or 
fundamental freedoms in the following provisions to persons serving in the Kenya Defence Forces or the 
National Police Service-
(a) Article 3I-Privacy; 
(b) Article 36-Freedom of association; 
(c) Article 37-Assembly, demonstration, picketing and petition; 
(d) Article 41-Labour relations; 
(e) Article 43-Economic and social rights; and 
(f) Article 49-Rights of arr~sted persons. 
Basically, there shall be no limitation of a fundamental right or freedom except by law meaning 
that in order for a limitation to occur it has to be under the operation of the law so that whoever 
limiting the right can and should be able to trace their authority to limit the right in question 
back to this article and support it with the relevant legislation that allows for the limitation in 
that circumstance. The provision continues that the limitation by law is only to the extent that 
is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. The idea of 'reasonability' or a ' reasonable man' is a widely applied 
principle in the legal world especially in the realm of tort. Of the popular definitions of the 
reasonable man is that he is the ordinary man, the average man, or the man on the Clapham 
omnibus.49 The reasonable person belongs to a family of hypothetical figures in law that 
include: the "right-thinking member of society," the "officious bystander50," the "reasonable 
parent," the "reasonable landlord," the "fair-minded and informed observer," the "person 
having ordinary skill in the art," and stretching back to Roman jurists, the figure of the bonus 
paterfamilias. Prima facie, this seems to be a fool proof way of determining a reasonable action, 
however in a situation where the court should decide if an incident of limitation fell below the 
standard of the reasonable man, the fact that the standard of care expected from this 
hypothetical character is objective; meaning that it does not take into account the characteristics 
or weaknesses or even circumstance of the limitation in the instant case. For example, the 
standard of care expected from a leaner-driver is the same as that required by a qualified driver. 
Therefore, does it follow that in the limitation of rights, the standard of care expected from the 
49 Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [I933] I KB 205 
50 Southern Foundries (I 926) Ltd v Shirlaw [I 939] 2 KB 206 
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court, the police or the civilian for example (or whoever with the requisite authority to limit) is 
the same? The same reasoning applied to the justifiability of limitation of rights will provide 
the same results because what is justifiable or not changes on a case to case basis. 
The condition of an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom 
is a guideline in a sense of the prevailing requisite that needs to be met in the process of 
limitation according to the 2010 Constitution. An irony plays out because it has been argued 
that limiting rights degrades human dignity and has the effect of curtailing freedom. 51 
The provision insists that no limit to the right or fundamental freedom will go so far as to 
derogate from its core or essential content. This is a maximum limit however, it would be 
difficult to apply objectively because rights are different and some despite the fact that they 
may not be absolute, require more protection than others. The right to life for example is one 
such case Vis a Vis the right to vote. 
Lastly, the provision insists that a provision in legislation may limit its application of rights 
and fundamental freedoms to persons serving in the Kenya Defence forces or The National 
Police Service as regards the following rights; Privacy, Freedom of association, Assembly, 
demonstration, picketing and petition, Labour relations, Economic and social rights and Rights 
of arrested persons. 
The above indicates the constitutional criteria for the limitation of the rights and fundamental 
freedoms in Kenya. The criteria can be inferred from the principles developed in the Canadian 
Supreme Court, in the landmark case of R. v Oakes52 that is referred to as the Oakes test. This 
is a test relied upon by Kenyan Courts and is considered persuasive in this jurisdiction 
especially because it is the key landmark case on this issue. Kenyan Jurisprudence is founded 
upon the tests laid out by this case. 
3.3 OAKS TEST 
Briefly, the facts of this case are that David Oakes was caught in possession of 8 grams of hash 
oil and a large sum of money ($619.45.). Oakes defended himself by stating that the money 
was from a government program and that the oil was for his own personal use. Despite this he 
was suspected of drug trafficking and was soon then arrested. He was then charged with 
unlawful possession of a narcotic for purpose of trafficking, in violation of the presumption of 
51 Roza Pati ,Rights and Their Limits: The Constitution for Europe in International and Comparative Legal 
Perspective, 23 BerkeleyJ. Int'!Law. 223 (2005). 
52 R v Oakes (1986) I S.C.R. 103 
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innocence of Charter ofRights and Freedoms in contravention ofS. 11 ofthe Narcotic Control 
Act of Canada. The lower court found that the two main functions of the Charter of Rights S. 
II were the fact that it guaranteed the rights which follow it and second that it stated the criteria 
against which justifications for limitations on those rights must be measured. Oakes was 
convicted only for possession despite the drug trafficking suspicions due to lack of evidence. 
His attorney brought the case up to the Ontario Court of Appeal where the court set out the 
following test as apposite considerations for limiting rights and freedoms, the first part: 
l. Requires an objective related to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free 
and democratic society. 53 This means there has to be a pressing and substantial 
objective for the law or government action. 
2. It must be shown that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified 
which implies that the means chosen to achieve the objective must be proportional to 
the burden on the rights of a claimant. 
The second part of the test is described as the "proportionality test" which requires the invoking 
party to show: 
I. That the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective 
in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational 
considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. 
2. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first 
sense, should impair "as little as possible" the right or freedom in question; 
3. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures 
which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the 
objective which has been identified as of "sufficient importance". 
When applying this test to the facts, the Court found that section 8 of the Narcotics Act did not 
pass the rational connection test because the "possession of a small or negligible quantity of 
narcotics does not support the inference of trafficking. It would be irrational to infer that a 
person had an intent to traffic on the basis of his or her possession of a very small quantity of 
53 Based on the analysis in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] I S.C.R. 295 
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narcotics. 54 Therefore, section 8 of the NCA was held to be in violation of the Charter and 
therefore of no force or effect. 
The principles especially of proportionality are captured in article 24 where the Constitution 
points out that the limitations set out under the provisions have to be prescribed in the Jaw. 
"A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and 
then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom .. . " 
Therefore implying that the benefits of the Jaw need to be greater than what it costs to limit the 
right or freedom effectively showing that in order to determine whether a law has breached a 
fundamental right or freedom, the Oaks test must be applied. Article 24 (2)(c) provides that no 
rights or fundamental freedoms can be limited so far as to derogate from its core or essential 
content and goes even further to fortify the importance of the proportionality test by including 
an additional safeguard against excessive limitation . 
Due to the dearth in precedents of rights limitation of rights analysis, comparative perspectives 
are particularly helpful in future jurisprudence of rights limitations as seen in the Canadian 
context. However it is important to note that that the sequential method of analyzing rights in 
Oakes has been softened in subsequent cases by the Canadian Supreme Court.55 
3.4 KENYAN COURTS INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 24 
The Kenyan courts seem to place a heavy reliance on the decision in R v Oakes as will be 
illustrated in the various case studies below: 
I. Geoffrey Andare v Attorney General56 
In this case, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of section 29 of the Kenya 
Information and Communication Act, Cap 411 A on the ground that it criminalizes publication 
of certain information in vague and overbroad terms, has a chilling effect on the guarantee to 
freedom of expression and creates an offence without considering the mens rea element on the 
part of the accused person. The petitioner argued that section 29 of the above mentioned Act 
is vague and over-broad especially with regard to the meaning of 'grossly offensive', 
'indecent', 'obscene 'menacing', 'causing annoyance' 'inconvenience' or 'needless anxiety'. 
54 R v Oakes (1986) 1 S.C.R. 103 
55 See Edwards Books & Art Ltd v The Queen [1986] 2 SCR 713 
56 Geoffrey Andare v Attorney General & 2 others [2016] eKLR 
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He contends that the section offends the principle of legality which requires that a law, 
especially one that limits a fundamental right and freedom, must be clear enough to be 
understood and must be precise enough to cover only the activities connected to the law 's 
purpose The court deliberated that the criteria set out in Article 24 of the Constitution of Kenya 
had been applied in cases where the question of the constitutionality of statutes was at issue, 
and is of assistance to the courts even were article 24 is not applicable and even went ahead to 
quote the Oakes case . Honorable Mumbi Ngugi, in her deliberation, considered some of the 
following questions, bearing in mind the express provisions of Article 24 and the criteria in R 
vs Oakes, 
"What is the purpose of the limitation, and how important is it? What is the relationship between 
the limitation and its purpose? Are there less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
intended?57" 
The Proportionality test was strictly adhered to and read with respect to various other 
provisions and the Court, concerned with the constitutionality of section 29 of the Kenya 
information and Communication Act, came to the conclusion that the section is 
unconstitutional for being couched in overbroad and vague terms that violate or threaten the 
right to freedom of association guaranteed under Article 33 ofthe Constitution. 
2. Kijuki Kiambi Paul Kagia & 5 Others v Clerk Meru Municipal 
Council Municipal council 
The matter of limitations was analyzed by the court. The Meru Council had stopped licensing 
scrap metal businesses and some citizens opposed such prohibition as unconstitutional. The 
court recognized that there was undeniable great public interest in the implementation of the 
resolution reached by the respondent to stop the licensing of scrap metal businesses. The fact 
was that the theft of drains, manholes, materials of various local authorities had been on the 
rise in the country prompting various local authorities to bar any trading of scrap metal within 
their jurisdictions. The court asserted that public interest must override private right or interest 
to halt possible prejudice to the administration of justice. It declared that there was a legitimate 
public expectation that the respondents decision should be implemented and the same had since 
March been implemented. The court found that if it granted the rights and fundamental 
57 Geoffrey An dare v Attorney General & 2 others [20161 eKLR 
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freedoms sought in the application by the petitioners, it would prejudice the rights of the vast 
majority. The application was dismissed. 
3. Robert Alai v The Hon Attorney General & another 58 
This petition raised a significant question of whether criticism of a public officer is a ground 
for limiting a fundamental right enshrined in the constitution. As seen from the constitution 
itself, the freedom of expression and to hold opinion, can only be limited by the constitution. 
The petitioner was charged with the offence of undermining the authority of a Public Officer 
contrary to Section 132 of the Penal Code59 . Particulars of the offence stated that; while using 
the open source website Twitter, the petitioner posted the words "Insulting Raila is what Uhuru 
can do. He hasn ' t realized the value of the Presidency. Adolescent President. This seat needs 
Maturity" which publication was calculated to bring into contempt the lawful authority of the 
President of the Republic of Kenya. The petitioner was arraigned in court and sought the 
following orders: 
a. A declaration that section 132 ofthe Penal Code is unconstitutional and invalid. 
b. A declaration that the continued enforcement of section 132 by the second respondent 
against the petitioner is unconstitutional. 
In its deliberation, the court stated that any limitation to a fundamental right especially the right 
to freedom of expression must be reasonable and justifiable and as was the present case, the 
limitation to freedom of expression by section 132 had to be justifiable. This being a 
democratic society, limitation of a right must not only be reasonable but also justified by the 
party seeking to limit that right. The court continued to stress that such limitation needed to 
strike a balance between the provision limiting the right and Article 24 of the constitution. 
Article 24(1) requires that there be reasonable and justifiable reasons for the limitation to a 
right. The first respondent filed grounds of opposition to the petition, stating that the petitioner 
had misinterpreted and misapprehended the sovereignty60 of the people to elect their leader, 
the freedom of expression, 61 the right to a fair hearing, and that the right under Article 33 (1 ), 
freedom of expression, was not absolute since it was curtailed by clause (2) and (3) ofthe same 
Article. It is true that the right to freedom of expression is limited by clause (2) and (3). 
58 Robert Alai v The Han Attorney General & another [2017] eKLR 
59 Section 132 of the Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya 
60 Article 1, COK 2010 
61 Article 33 (1) COK 2010 
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However, that limitation should be in terms of the two sub-Articles. The court eventually 
allowed all the petitioners orders declaring that Section 132 of the Penal Code is 
unconstitutional and invalid and that the continued enforcement of Section 132 of the Penal 
Code by the second respondent against the petitioner herein was unconstitutional and a 
violation his fundamental right to freedom of expression. Criminalizing criticism like in the 
case above, is a curtailment of the right to speak about public officers and it derogates ones 
right to hold opinion. The Bill of Rights in our transformative constitution is clear that rights 
are for enjoyment as opposed to curtailment. 
3.5 OTHER LIMITATION CLAUSES IN THE CONSTITUTION 
Noteworthy is that article 24 is not the only clause in the constitution that prescribes the 
limitation process on various rights. There are several other provisions that limit specific rights 
that can be said to be an extension or manifestation of article 24. 
3.5.1 LIMITATION IN ARTICLE 33 ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The limitation imposed in article 33 of the COK is similar to the limitations in article 24 in the 
sense that they are both general in that they do not specify to what extent this right is limited 
except how it is justified. Freedom of expression is a large building block in any democracy 
which is one of the reasons why this particular freedom is fiercely protected world over. The 
fact of a limitation clause in the provisions governing freedom of expression in Kenya imply 
that this is not an absolute right. Article 33 (2) states: 
33. (1) eve1y person has the right to freedom of expression, which includes-
(a) Freedom to seek, receive or impart information or ideas; 
(b) Freedom of artistic creativity; 
(c) Academic freedom andfreedom of scientific research. 
(2) The right to freedom of expression does not extend to-
(a) Propaganda for war; 
(b) Incitement to violence; 
(c) Hate speech; or 
(d) Advocacy of hatred that-
(i) Constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others or incitement to cause harm; or 
(ii) Is based on any ground of discrimination specified or contemplated in Article 27 {4). 
(3) In the exercise of the right to fi'eedom of expression, eve1y person shall respect the rights and 
reputation of others. 
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3.5.2 LIMITATION IN ARTICLE 32 OF THE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, 
RELIGION, BELIEF AND OPINION. 
Article 8 of the COK states that there shall be no state religion. This gives freedom to Kenyans 
to profess any faith under the sun. Article 32 provides obligations by the state to ensure 
legislation and other instruments do not violate any person's freedom of conscience, religion, 
belief and opinion. By virtue of the facts that the general rules of international law and any 
treaty or convention ratified by Kenya forms part of the laws of Kenya62 and that Kenya is a 
party to The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights63 , The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights all stipulate that the 
freedom of thought conscience and religion includes the freedom to change ones beliefs, in 
community or individually, to manifest their religion or belief in teaching , practice, worship 
and observance. 
The best instance of limitation of this right is brought out in a Kenyan case, Seventh Day 
Adventist Church (East Africa) Limited v Minister for Education & 3 others64 where a petition 
was brought before the courts to challenge an alleged violation of the rights conferred in article 
32 for SDA students across the country. The petitioner's arguments were based on the fact that 
public schools in the country restrict and hinder opportunities available for SDA students to 
worship during the Sabbath hours, between sunset Friday and Saturday. Relying on landmark 
South African case, Christian Education of South Africa v Minister for Education65 that 
established that freedom of religion includes both the right to have a belief and the right to 
express that belief in public. The respondents argued by contending that people should enjoy 
all things regardless of the faiths they profess and therefore should not be given any special 
treatment. They invoked article 24 claiming that the limitation of that freedom was not absolute 
and could therefore be qualified by a reasonable and justifiable criteria in an open and 
democratic society which had to be balanced against the right to education which they argued 
should be held on a higher pedestal . The judge held that there lacked a discriminatory element 
because all the students in the particular school where held to the same standard and used the 
62 S. 2 (5) and (6) Constitution of Kenya 2010 
63 Declaration adopted by the UN general assembly on 10 December 1948 at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. 
64 Seventh Day Adventist Church (East Africa) Limited v Minister for Education & 3 others [2014] eKLR 
65 Christian Education of South Africa v Minister for Education (CCT 4/00) 2000 
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floodgates argument with regard to other public schools in the country. And therefore denied 
the petitioners prayers arguing that the test of proportionality given in article 24 was met. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Kenyan courts seem to integrate the required elements of the proportionality 
principle in imposing limitation on certain rights and freedoms as seen above, guided by the 
provisions in article 24. More outstanding is the use of article 24 to justify the limitation of one 
derogable right and even in preference and with respect to another as shown in the Seventh 
Day Adventist case. The Kenyan limitation clauses are mostly general limitation clauses which 
is a step up from the claw back clauses that filled the previous constitution. However, its 
generality also presents in itself a problem which this chapter evidences in showing the courts 
reliance on cases from other jurisdictions to decide cases that require the application of the 
limitation clause because of the breath of the scope of the clause. This is also very likely to 
lead to misuse as mentioned above. 
24 
CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS DEALING WITH LIMITATION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A significant element in the development of international instruments protecting human rights 
was the movement away from the use of single (general) limitation clauses to the elaboration 
of specific limitation clauses in each article. The limitation provisions are found in several 
articles of the human rights Covenants as well as in other regiomd human rights instruments. 
Any restriction on the rights or freedoms provided for in universal or regional human rights 
instruments must meet three requirements: first, it must be prescribed by law (the principle of 
legality), second, it must have justified one of the specified legitimate aims pursued in the 
pa1ticular article and third, the limitation in all circumstances must be necessary in a democratic 
society.66 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the specific principles related to the 
limitation provisions in international and regional human rights instruments by examining 
select international rights instruments that best address the subject of limitations and comparing 
them to Kenya's own limitation clauses in order to determine if they meet the standard and the 
effect of that thereafter. The International Human Right Conventions that will be discussed are, 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). 
4.2 LIMITATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN 
AND PEOPLES RIGHTS (ACHPR) 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) is an international human 
rights instrument that is intended to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms in 
the African continent. The Commission is officially charged with three major functions: the 
protection of human and peoples' rights, the promotion of human and peoples' rights and the 
interpretation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Human rights are 
generally categorized into three generations of rights; civil and political rights, economic and 
66 Basic principles governing limitations on individual rights and freedoms in human rights instruments 
Mohamed Elewa Badar, the International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 7, Iss. 4, 2003 
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socio economic rights and group and people's rights. This Charter is the first of its kind to 
protect all these Generations of rights in one instrument, without drawing any distinctions 
concerning their justifiability or implementation. 
Interestingly, the African Charter does not contain a derogation clause. This means that 
derogations are not permitted under the Charter therefore, limitations on the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies and special 
circumstances. The only legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the 
Charter are found in atticle 27(2) of the ACHPR which fall under Chapter 2 of the charter that 
stipulates the individual's duties. Some of the duties stipulated in article 27 are, that every 
individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally 
recognized communities and the international community. The rights and freedoms of each 
individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality 
and common interest. 
The absence of an express derogation clause is odd especially in the context of the member 
states of the African Charter that frequently declare states of emergency67 . To add on to this is 
the ironical fact that most African constitutions contain such a clause. This deviation from the 
norm raises several questions and invokes vast feelings about the charter. Despite this, 
limitations ought to take the form of law which does not specifically apply to one group or 
legal personality as is illustrated in the case of Constitutional Rights Projects V Nigeria68 where 
the Nigerian military government in 1994, issued three decrees proscribing three different 
Nigerian newspapers. The complainants argued that the decrees violated article 9(2) of the 
African Charter which stipulated that every individual has the right to freedom of expression 
within the law. Nigerian government argued that the decrees constituted the law and that 
decrees were justified in special circumstances. While the African commission agreed that the 
decrees constituted the law, they remarked that the legal regulation targeting one group (the 
media) raised a serious danger of discrimination and as a result the finding introduced the 
requirement must take the formal laws of general application. 
The African Charter embodies three types of limitation namely, right specific limitation, right 
specific claw back clauses and the general limitation clause. In spite of the protection the 
African Charter offers, the presence of the claw back clause invokes fear . that the rights 
67 Early States and State Formation in Africa, Graham Connah 
68 Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria Communication No. 143/1995 (1996) 
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protected in the Charter may be equated with the domestic laws of the state.69 The reason being 
that most civil and political rights are limited by inter alia terms such as "except for reasons 
and conditions previously laid down by law," or "subject to law and order"70 . These limitations 
may be criticized as subjecting the right guaranteed to domestic laws hence weakening their 
scope and content when it comes to their application. However the African Court of Human 
Rights disproved this by declining to subject the protected rights to domestic laws of a state as 
is shown in the case, Civil liberties Organization (With reference to the Nigerian Bar 
Association) v Nigeria. 71 The African Commission held that the competent authorities in 
regulation the right to the extent that exercising it is impossible but rather subject to those 
provisions within the standards of both the national constitution and international human rights 
instruments. 
The commission, just like the Kenyan Courts applies the test of proportionality to satisfy that 
a limitation clause constitutes the general laws of application and this is how they have 
managed to limit rights justifiably even without a derogation clause, making it easy to outweigh 
the evils of limitations through strict proportionality with necessity to obtain absolute 
advantages .Therefore, the jurisprudence of the African Commission on the interpretation of 
the limitation clause is that for the limitations to be valid they ought to be in line with the states 
party's obligations under the charter. Furthermore, this has enabled the African commission to 
construe the limitation clause by relying on its obligation to interpret the African charter in 
view ofthe interpretations of the other international human rights instruments. 
The principles that guide the Kenyan provisions and those of the Charter of proportionality and 
legality in limiting rights are similar. However, as mentioned, alongside the rights specific 
clauses and general clauses are the claw back clauses which Kenyans fought very hard to be 
rid of in the 2010 Constitution. Above this, the Charter contains norm-based limitation clauses 
that require the limiting laws to serve specific objectives. These ensure that laws are 
successfully aimed at protecting matters of national interest like national security and the rights 
and freedoms of others without allowing the state boundless discretion. The advantage of this 
over claw back clauses is that they are limited to some right and therefore cannot be used as 
claw back clauses to limit rights. The African commission has observed that the claw back 
69 Frans_Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, (2007) 238 
7° FransViljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, (2007) 239 
71 Civil liberties Organization (With reference to the Nigerian Bar Association) v Nigeria gth Annual Activity 
Report. Para 16 
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clause must not be interpreted against the Charter and that the recourse to them should not be 
used as a means of giving evidence to violate the express provisions of the Charter from the 
case International v Zambia72 where the Zambian Government invoked the norm based 
limitation to the effect that the right must be subject to the restrictions provided for in the law 
for the protection of national security, law, order and morality in which way, protects the 
Charter form the negative effects of the claw back clause. 
4.3 LIMITATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONIMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (CESCR) 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is the body of independent 
experts that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights by its States parties.73 It was designed to ensure protection of economic, social 
and cultural rights. Article 4 of CESCR acts as the general clause applicable to all rights other 
than the right specific limitations that are provided in the covenant. Article 4 provides as 
follows 
Article 4 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by 
the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such 
limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these 
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 
This limitation clause allows for its rights to be limited along the lines of progressive realization 
and not of immediate application because the rights are resource based. Simply put, under the 
covenant, socio-economic rights are only enjoyed when where the resources of a state permit 
its provision. This can potentially create a problem because states could minimally provide for 
certain rights then claim issue of lack of resources for failure to honor its promises. Therefore, 
lack of resources does not absolve a state from performing its minimal threshold stipulated 
under the convention being the position espoused by scholars when they posit that the core 
principles is that limitations cannot lawfully reduce the rights beneath their minimum core as 
the lack of resources cannot do so_74 
72 International v Zambia Comm.No.212/98 (1999) 
73 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRintro.aspx 
74 Ben Saul et al, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights: commentary, cases and 
materials. 
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The purpose oflimitation should not only promote the welfare of the society but it should also 
further the wellbeing of the society in a positive manner.75 A good example of this limitation 
at play would be as in the case of Centre For Minority Rights Development V Kenya76 where 
the African Commission analyzed the limitation on the right of the people to freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources as in article 1 of CESCR, which is concerned, with thee 
forcible removal of an indigenous community from their ancestral land. The African 
Commission ruled that limitations on group economic rights were not justifiable in the 
circumstances in the following terms: 
"that the state has a duty to evaluate whether the restriction on the right to private property was 
necessary to preserve the survival of the endorois community despite the fact that they had no attachment 
to the minerals that the state was interested on. Nevertheless, it is instructive to know that the right to 
natural recourses contained within the traditional lands of the endorois was vested in them. Hence, it is 
clear, that a group of people inhabiting a specific region within a state may claim the protection of article 
21 of the African Charter. Moreover, article 14 of the African charter indicates that the rest of what is in 
accordance with appropriate laws and what constitutes the general interest of the community should be 
satisfied." 
The focus on limitation is not based only on the formal existence of the law but also in the 
nature ofthe laws itself. For example, the law reveals itself in various forms like Constitutional 
law, regional law, International law and Administrative law to mention a few on the condition 
that it is accessible to the community at large. This makes it legal for a state to limit rights 
based on the aspects of their religious, traditional or customary law.77 The CESCR Committee 
noted that states have adopted traditional or customary law in limiting CESCR rights should 
not impose a single religion or tradition of a group to the whole society.78 When criticizing this 
approach, the CESCR condemned the Iranian Constitution under its observation that the Iranian 
constitution purported to qualify CESCR requirements oftheir consistency with only Islam and 
no other religion. Moreover, the Committee on the ESCR observed that the enjoyment of 
universally recognized rights were subjected to Islamic limitations that had a negative impact 
on the application of the CESCR in relation to the principle of non-discrimination and 
equality.79 
75 Limburg principles on the implementation of the CESCR, E/CN,4/1987 /17,8 January 
76ACPHR Communication No 276/2003 276/03 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) I Kenya 
77 HRC, General Comment No. 34, CCPR/C/G/34 (12 September 2011) 
78 CESCR, Concluding Observation: Iran E/C.12/1993/7(9TH June 1993) 
79 CESCR, Concluding Observation: Iran E/C.12/1993/7(9TH June 1993) 
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Lastly, The Limburg principles are a guideline that addresses the complexities of the 
substantive issues covered by the CESCR and sets the nature and scope of obligations of state 
Parties to the covenant in terms of facilitation of the realization of the rights guaranteed 
therein.80 These Principles have proven an important step in the development of understanding 
ofthe nature and scope of states' obligation with regard to economic, social and cultural (ESC) 
rights. A process that has been continued by the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
ESC Rights and the 2011 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
Area of ESC Rights. 81 
4.4 LIMITATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT FOR 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR) 
The United Nations International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) attempts to 
ensure the protection of civil and political rights. It was adopted by the United Nations' General 
Assembly on December 19, 1966, and it came into force on March 23, 1976. The ICCPR 
recognizes the inherent dignity of each individual and undertakes to promote conditions within 
states to allow the enjoyment of civil and political rights. 82 Countries that have ratified the 
Covenant are obligated "to protect and preserve basic human rights and compelled to take 
administrative, judicial, and legislative measures in order to protect the rights enshrined in the 
treaty and to provide an effective remedy." There are currently 74 signatories and 168 parties 
to the ICCPR. 83 
The approach towards limitations under the ICESCR is quite different from that of the ICCPR. 
The ICCPR does not have a general limitation clause and instead opts for a rights specific 
limitation clauses. The ICCPR came into force after the world had witnessed great human 
violations and therefore was borne offthe need to protect and guarantee individual rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 84 In order to ensure that rights are not violated by the state, the UN 
included limitation clauses in the ICCPR because it is understood that states have the need 
when circumstances call for, to limit some ascertained rights. For example, the circumstance 
80 Limburg Principles on the implementation of the CESCR, EICN,4/l987117, gTH January 
81 https :IIW>'Av.maastrichtuniversity.nl/eventsllimburg-principles-and-migration 
82 h ttps :I I eel a.onrlsu mmarv- in ternati o nal-covenanl-on-c i vi l-and-pol i ti ca 1-ri ghts- i ccprl 
83 https:llccl a.orglsummarv-i nternational-covenant-on-ci vi l-and-pol itical-ri ghts-iccprl 
84 h ttps :1 Icc l a.orgl su mm arv-in ternati o nat-covenant -on-civil-and-pol it i ca 1-ri ghts- i ccprl 
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contemplated in article 5 of the ICCPR allows limitations only in the situation when the life of 
a state is threatened during the existence of a public emergency.85 
Various other limitations have been incorporated into the ICCPR. Article 12 Imposes a 
limitation on the right to freedom of residence thus; 
" ... rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary 
to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms 
of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant."86 
Article 18 (3) provides the extent to which the limitation of religion will be subject to. Such 
limitation as envisaged must be prescribed by law and deemed necessary to protect public 
order, safety, morals or health or the rights and freedoms of others. To add on to this, article 
19 provides that everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. This right 
is subjected to a restriction which is imposed to ensuring respect of the rights and reputation of 
other people and protection of public order or of state security, or of public health morals. 87 
As stated earlier, there must be a clear criteria or the limitation of rights and fundamental 
freedoms as stipulated in international law. In this regard, proportionality, necessity, the least 
restrictive alternatives and appropriateness are the main criteria for assessing the limitable 
scope of! imitation of the rights all present in article 24 of the 2010 Constitution .This criterion 
can be found in the Sirucasa principles on limitation and derogation provisions ofthe ICCPR.88 
These principles stipulate that any measure taken to restrict human rights should be legal, non-
arbitrary or discriminatory, proportionate, necessary and the least restrictive means that are 
reasonable under the circumstances. Article 10 of the Sirucasa Principles provides that 
whenever a limitation is required in terms of the covenant to be necessary implies that the 
limitation meets the following thresholds; one is that it is justified under the relevant provisions 
of the covenant. Secondly, it must be responding to a pressing public and social need, three, 
pursuing a legitimate aim and must be proportionate to that aim. 
The principles have been buttressed and made possible by the Human Rights Committee89 
(HRC), which is a treaty monitoring body established under article 28 of the ICCPR mandated 
to interpret rights guaranteed under the convention and their implementation by state parties. 
85 Art 5, ICCPR 
86 Article 12(3) ICCPR. 
87 Article 19(3), ICCPR 
88 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Annex (1985). U.N Doc.E/CNA/1985/4 
89 http://www .ohch r.org/EN/H RBod i es/CCPR/Pages/CCP Rl ntro. aspx 
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The HRC has provided its exhaustive interpretation of the limitation clauses in articles 12, 18, 
and 19. As regards freedom of movement as provided for in article I 2, it was stated in general 
comment 2790 that the law restricting this freedom ought to identify the legal standard upon 
which the restriction is grounded. The HRC has also further emphasized that article 12(3) of 
the ICCPR noticeably indicates that the limitations must not only serve their permissible 
purposes but that they must also be necessary to protect them which doubles back to the 
principle of proportionality. This is also a requirement in the 2010 Constitution in article 24 
where among the relevant factors considered for limitation to take place legally is the 
importance of the purpose of limitation as well as the nature and extent of the limitation. 
It is also categorical that any assessment as to the limitation of that claim shall be made on 
objective considerations. These principles put safeguard measures on excesses by state power 
to ensure that individual rights and fundamental freedoms are not limited at the whims of the 
state officials acting on malice. Any restriction imposed on a state must be of a limited duration, 
respectful of human dignity and subject to review. In conclusion for limitation to be legitimate 
under the ICCPR, it must fall under the conditions defined under article 19(3) of the ICCPR. 
That is, it should be provided for by law, it should have a legitimate aim and it should be 
necessary. These requirements are similar to the Kenyan provisions in the Constitution 2010, 
where a right or fundamental right is not limited except by law and only to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter with relevance to permissible limitations, has observed that the limitations 
imposed ought not to violate the any rights at stake. They should not conflict with the minimum 
core rights and that, limitations ought to respect the principle of proportionality which require 
the state to show the scope and severity of its limitation as being proportionate to the aims such 
measure seek to pursue like the general welfare of the society. 
The international Instruments detailed above, that is, the African Charter For Human NAD 
Peoples Rights (ACHPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) and the International Covenant for Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) all have 
different approaches to the way the go about the process of limitation of rights be it a simple 
general limitation clause or right specific limitation clauses. However, more importantly is that 
90 General Comments adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under article 40 para 4 of the ICCPR at the 
1783'd meeting session 67 1999. 
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all these instruments seem to rely on the same basic human principles like dignity and similar 
legal principles like reasonableness, proportionality in order to prescribe the restriction of 
human rights. These are the very same principles that educated the drafting process for the 
general limitation clauses that Kenyans experience in the 2010 Constitution. 
The 2010 Constitution states that A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not 
be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right or fundamental 
freedom; the importance ofthe purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; 
the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual 
does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and the relation between the 
limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
All these requirements are a culmination of the various guiding principles behind the 
international human rights instruments like the Sirucasa principles referred to above. It would 
seem that there are more similarities between the Kenyan limitation of rights and fundamental 
clauses and the International standard for such a limitation clause with respect to the ACHPR, 
ICCPR and CESCR than differences. 
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CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this study was to assess Kenya's 2010 Constitutional framework 
espoused mainly in article 24 of the Constitution in providing safeguards to the limitation of 
rights and fundamental freed against the international framework derived from the international 
legal instruments that provide the standard as regards the protection of human rights. In 
addition to this, this study also set out to establish the concepts and some principles and to the 
extent in which the Constitution provides a proper formula in limiting the rights of a citizen. In 
order to realize these objectives, the study undertook a desk and library based research that 
mainly relied on published materials, national and regional frameworks, organization reports, 
reviews of books and articles and select internet sources. The study is five chapters that discuss 
various issues as is outlined in the objectives of the study. 
Chapter one sets the stage for the dissertation explaining the hypothesis that the limitation 
clause in the 2010 Constitution is a general limitation clause whose interpretation in the courts 
impacts on all Kenyans. If not checked, this ability to limit rights can be counterproductive to 
having protected rights in the first place. The formulation of the limitations of human rights 
clause under COK 2010 is deleterious to the protected rights because despite the fact that 
limiting rights is legitimate and justifiable, such limitation must be held against international 
standards, be justifiable in an open and democratic society that is based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, having in mind that any limitation should be reasonable, justifiable and 
proportionate. Due. to its generality, the limitation clause is wide open and can be subject to 
abuse. It continued to set out that the purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote 
social justice and the realization of the potential of all human beings therefore it is in every 
Kenyans best interest that this study is conducted in order to find out if the process of limitation 
of their fundamental rights and freedoms does not expose them to abuse and meets the 
International Standard that should ideally be the basic requirement for such a process. 
Chapter two discusses the theoretical framework and introduces and explains the idea of human 
rights as the basic rights and freedoms that belong to every person in the world, by virtue of 
34 
being human from birth until death that apply regardless of origin, belief or way of life. They 
can never be taken away, although they can sometimes be restricted. These restrictions, are 
legal and justifiable whose backbone is the social contract. The social contract is one of the 
arguments that justifies limitation of right because in order for society to live harmoniously, 
the relevant governing authority, the state, must guarantee rights especially so that all its 
citizens can enjoy them. Therefore the authority has to limit rights to avoid an overlap. This 
power to limit comes first from the people who agree to give up their freedoms and liberties to 
a community for better protection of their rights. This concept is well embedded in the Kenyan 
constitution by way of the principle of sovereignty this chapter concludes by tying together the 
theoretical framework. 
Chapter three undertakes an analysis of article 24 the prov1s1on that carnes the general 
limitation clause, the nature and structure of the limitation clause and its interpretation and 
implementation in Kenyan courts. The Article provides that a right or fundamental freedom in 
the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including but not limited 
to the nature of the right or fundamental freedom, the importance of the purpose and extent of 
the limitation. A discussion of the case R v Oakes91 , the key authority in rights limitation 
provides the test on analysis of the limitation clause that allows reasonable limitations on rights 
and freedoms through legislation. The test which is a necessity and proportionality test is 
captured in article 24 which provides that no rights or fundamental freedoms can be limited so 
far as to derogate from its core or essential content and goes even further to fortify the 
importance of the proportionality test by including an additional safeguard against excessive 
limitation·. An examination of Kenyan Cases reveals that the Kenyan courts rely heavily on 
this precedent despite being foreign to decide Kenyan cases. This chapter concludes by 
showing the fact that the 20 l 0 Constitution also carries right specific limitation clauses like the 
instances of Article 33 on the Freedom of expression and article 32 on the freedom of 
conscience, belief, religion and opinion, despite the general limitation clause found in Article 
24. 
91 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR at 255 
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Chapter four provided an in depth analysis of the international and regional human rights 
instruments, more specifically the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights (ACPHR), 
International Covenant for Civil AND Political rights(ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). Upon comparing the general clause 
provisions of Article 24 and those in the African Charter it is evident that the principles of 
proportionality and legality in limiting rights are similar. However, as mentioned, alongside 
the rights specific clauses and general clauses are the claw back clauses present in the African 
Charter which Kenyans fought very hard to be rid off in the 2010 Constitution. Above this, the 
Charter contains norm-based limitation clauses that require the limiting laws to serve specific 
objectives in order to ensure that laws are successfully aimed at protecting matters of national 
interest like national security and the rights and freedoms of others without allowing the state 
boundless discretion. The advantage of this over claw back clauses is that they are limited to 
some right and therefore cannot be used as claw back clauses to limit rights. 
Article 4 of CESCR acts as the general clause applicable to all rights other than the right 
specific limitations that are provided in the covenant. This limitation clause allows for its rights 
to be limited along the lines of progressive realization and not of immediate application because 
the rights are resource based. Simply put, under the covenant, socio-economic rights are only 
enjoyed when where the resources of a state permit its provision. The use of both general and 
rights specific clauses in the CESCR is similar to the structure of the Provisions in the Kenyan 
constitution of limitation. The United Nations International Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) take on limitation is different from the other International instruments mainly 
because the ICCPR does not have a general limitation clause and instead opts for a rights 
specific limitation clauses. In this regard, proportionality, necessity, the least restrictive 
alternatives and appropriateness are the main criteria for assessing the limitable scope of 
limitation of the rights all present in article 24 of the 2010 Constitution .This very criterion can 
be found in the Sirucasa principles on limitation and derogation provisions of the ICCPR. 92 
These principles stipulate that any measure taken to restrict human rights should be legal, non-
arbitrary or discriminatory, proportionate, necessary and the least restrictive means that are 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
92 Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Annex (1985). U.N Doc.E/CN.4/1985/4 
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From the study one can safely conclude that the law in Kenya appears to integrate the required 
elements of the proportionality principle in imposing limitations on certain rights and freedoms 
as well as case law emanating case law from the courts. In many instances, the Kenyan legal 
system has embraced and incorporated the principles governing limitations of rights as 
enshrined in both international and regional instruments. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study calls upon the Judiciary to be vigilant in its role of protecting the rights guaranteed 
in the Constitution and in the provision of interpretation in determining whether a limitation 
clause has been properly imposed when such cases as brought before them for deliberation. 
Kenya, being a common law system adopting new legislation in the form of the Constitution 
relies heavily on precedence that is set by superior courts. The decisions arrived at by judges 
in analyzing legal principles are supposed to be sounds, guided by the constitution statutes and 
legal policy. In Kenya, the 2010 Constitution has imposed a duty on the courts to give effect to 
the provisions of the law in so far as statute permits.93 Where any law is inconsistent with the 
Constitution which is the supreme law of the land, the courts have complete authority and duty 
to pronounce a declaration of incompatibility. As an independent organ of government, the 
judiciary has a duty to uphold constitutionalism and make declaratory orders where the other 
organs of governments have failed to adhere to the constitution or to correct any failures 
resulting from a misapplication of the law. 
The law is the greatest tool that we have that we can use to ensure the people's rights are 
protected. In itself the provisions contained in the Kenyan Constitution 2010 are capable of 
being an instrument that can successfully be used to ensure proper limitation. A large duty lies 
as aforementioned in the judiciary to keenly interpret and apply the law especially as regards 
limitation. The National assembly is equally tasked with the role of ensuring that caution is 
taken especially when performing its legislative duties in order to avoid arbitrarily depriving 
any citizens of their rights. Therefore, in so far as limitations are concerned, all acts of 
parliament must conform to the international standard when drafting and passing laws and must 
conform to constitutional pressures. In Kenya, legislative power is vested by the Constitution 
in parliament. The National assembly has not only the role of law making, but also the 
establishment and development of laws through amendments or statutory legislation. 
93 Article 159(1)(e) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 
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Conclusively, parliament must ensure utmost adherence to the rule of law. This will assist in 
meeting parameters within which rights can be limited to alleviate violations 
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